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Latent Crusaders: Narrative Strategies of Survival
in Early Modern Danubian Principalities, 1550-1750
Caius Dobrescu and Sorin Adam Matei 1
Abstract
The essay concentrates on a master narrative strategy presiding over the
early emergence of modernity in the area in which contemporary Romania is situated. This narrative strategy richly illustrates the neoByzantine survival strategies of the Greek elites who ruled the Danubian Principalities (Moldova and Valahia) during the earlier stages of
Romanian modernization (18th century). Early modem Romanian political and intellectual elites borrowed from the post-Byzantine political
theology a set of Gnostic-inflected narrative strategies to explain their
subordination to alien powers (Turkish, Ottoman, Russian, Austrian, or
Hungarian). These strategies operated a reversal of "real" and "unreal"
or of "essential" and "fleeting" attributes of social-historical situations.
The aim of these strategies was to construct the local elites as the
agents of a political ideology of national redemption that will ultimately put them above their temporary masters. The paper focuses mainly
on the so-called Phanariot period (17th to 18th Centuries).
At the middle of the 16th century the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith spanning three
continents under the rule of its most famous Sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent (15201566) (lnalcik, 2001 ). Only a few years before (1512) and after several decades of resistance and negotiations, the Romanian Principality of Moldova, a buffer state between
the Ottomans, Poland, and Hungary finally accepted the Sultan as its sovereign lord
(Georgescu, 1991). The process of submission was neither simple nor swift. ~tefan the
Great was the first Moldovan ruler to.pay tribute to the Turks in 1483, while his son Bogdan III officially and permanently submitted to the Sultan in 1512 (Georgescu, 1991).
This was not, however, the end ofMoldova's resistance to Turkish rules. Several wars of
attrition under various princes stretched Moldova's resistance to Ottoman dominance for
1
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a few more decades. One of the last episodes of active opposition took place under Prince
Petru Rare~ who occupied Moldova 's throne twice, between 1527-1538 and 1541-1546
(Simanschi, 1978). Although officially an Ottoman vassal, Rare~ opposed Ottoman expansionism by all means possible, from diplomacy to warfare. After losing a major battle
in 1538 and three years of negotiations as a vagrant prince he bought his crown back
from the Turks and became a much more, although not always, reliable ally of the Ottomans (Simanschi, 1978).
The contradictory spirit of Petru Rarefs reigns is captured by the frescoes on the
outer walls of several Moldavian monasteries (Probata, Moldovita, Humor) that the Moldavian Prince commissioned (Dragut, 1984; Dumitrescu, 2001 ; Mandru, 1995). The
murals, which could be seen even by the occasional pilgrim, display a significant anachronism. They depict in great and vivid detail a rather obscure episode of Byzantine history. In 626 the Persians sieged both by land and by sea the Byzantine capital, Constantinople (Howard-Johnston, 2006). The attackers were, however, repulsed by Emperor
Heraklius I (610-641) in a gigantic amphibious battle. At the time, the episode was interpreted as an example of divine intervention in human affairs . According to legend, Constantinople was saved by the intercession of the Virgin Mary, who showed her powers in
the form of a storm that sunk the enemy fleet (Gambero, 1999).
The Moldovan frescoes presented the protagonists in a different light. The attackers
appear dressed in the garb and use weapons of a different battle, which took place under
the same walls, but over 800 years later and with a different outcome. The besiegers wear
turbans and fire cannons (Mandru, 1995). These are the Ottomans who ultimately took
Constantinople, putting an end to the Eastern Orthodox Christian Empire of Byzantium in
1453 (Runciman, 1990), just a few decades before the frescos were finished. The murals
dramatically reinterpret the entire history of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, turning a
recent defeat into a long past victory. Furthermore, other contemporary Moldovan church
frescoes (e.g., Varone!) show the recent conquerors of Constantinople at the head of a
line of infidels who at Doomsday will be converted to Christianity by Moses himself
(Musicescu & Ulea, 1969; Ulea, 1963).
The theological message of the Moldavian frescoes and their crusading mood seems
totally misplaced given the political and military reality of the time. Are these messages,
as some scholars suggest (Ulea, 1963), of belligerence and active resistance? Are they
signs of a resurgent crusading spirit in Moldova? While the answer could be "yes," an
important caveat is necessary. A 16th century Russian theologian and traveler who lived
for a while at Petru Rarefs court, Ivan Peresvetov, assigns to the Moldavian prince the
belief that the fall of Constantinople was not a sign of defeat, but one of salvation (Dumitrescu, 2001 ). The Russian traveler relates in a letter dedicated to Ivan the Terrible, the
Russian Tsar, that Rare~ believed that God himself delivered Constantinople to the Turks
to teach Christians a lesson of humility (Cazacu, 1983). The Ottoman Sultan was in his
view an instrument of Christian justice and redemption:
This is what Petru Rare~ has to say about the Turkish Emperor, Mohammed: [After] the Greek [emperors and noblemen] scoffed at the Holy Cross, betrayed their
people and robbed them by unjust judgments making themselves rich with treasures wrung from Christian tears and blood[ ... ] the infidel Sultan Mohamed knew
God's might [and restored justice], conquering Constantinople and restoring God-
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loved justice; he besotted God with his heartfelt deeds and God helped him take
possession of many other realms. (Durnitrescu, 2001 , p. 78)
Since Peresvetov's opuscul is a political and moral tract (Ciobanu, 1945) belonging
to the specula principum or Fiirstenspiegel genre, whose goal is to instruct by parable
(Nederman, 1998), not by exact historical example, the words quoted above might (Cazacu, 1983), or might not (Schneck, 2005), reflect Petru Rarefs personal opinion. As an
interpretation of Ottoman success, written at the middle of the 16th century after extensive travels throughout Eastern Europe, the book might yet very well reflect an opinion
that was quite common at the Eastern Orthodox courts of that time. The Ottomans
seemed, at their zenith, unstoppable. Even highly aggressive European military monarchies, such as Hungary, were wiped out by the Turks. What other power could guide their
actions than Divine Providence? Rare~ , the clerics who supervised the building of these
monasteries, and the artists who painted their walls might have very well subscribed to
the idea that Providence was sending Eastern Christianity a message. Given the aim of
Peresvetov's book to instruct the Russian Tsar and regenerate the defensive spirit of
Eastern Christianity, which had sunken to its lowest point, the submission of Moldova
and the defensive position of Eastern Christianity could have been interpreted very plausibly as a sign of divine intervention and even secret redemption.
According to Ciobanu (2002), the anachronism found in the mural dedicated to the
"pagan siege of Constantinople" could then be interpreted not as a celebration of antiTurkish sentiment, but as a sign of God's power to deliver his people even when they
don't deserve or recognize it. The Moldovan frescos and the manner in which they contradict political realities could be the earliest expression of an ideology of salvation in
submission. This reflects, in our view, not only some important nee-Byzantine narrative
strategies (Georgescu, 1991; lorga, 2000; Mango, 2005; Runciman, 1999), but also a
Gnostic-like pattern of thought, which we propose as a possible source for that strand of
modern Romanian national ideology according to which national submission and oppression is in fact a form of election.

Gnostic-like Narrative Strategies: Definitions and Operationalization
The role of Gnosticism in European and Middle Eastern political and religious history
has been largely investigated and documented (Culianu, 1992, 2006; Jonas, 1963; Li:iwith, 1957; Taubes, 1947; Voegelin, 2004). The focus of previous investigations was
directed at demonstrating how core modem ideologies, such as existentialism or socialism, bear the marks of Gnosticism, especially under its dualistic guise (Voegelin, 2004).
From a broader perspective, such inquiries emphasize that a dualist, Gnostic vision of the
world, which need not be directly or overtly religious, has constantly preoccupied, when
not directly informed, the modem mind. Significantly, this research tradition emphasizes
the heuristic meaning of the term, making a clear distinction between Gnosticism, seen as
a specific religion, and the Gnostic mind set, which is often seen as a secular and philosophical approach to explaining the world and history.
In the paper we employ "Gnosticism" in the later sense of the term. It refers to a type
of thought pattern and narrative strategy that emerges in times of crisis and not always as
a direct historical descendent of the first Gnosticism. It typically takes the shape of intel-
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lectual responses formulated as explicative narrative themes or explanatory frameworks
that aimed to offer solutions to crisis and transition situations (Jonas, 1963).
It is important to note that these beliefs are eclectic not only in their origins, themes,
or motives, but also because of their sophisticated combination of various mystical and
philosophical "mythems" (i.e., mythological patterns of thinking). In fact, its syncretism
makes it more of a philosophical than religious enterprise (Taubes, 1947). Gnosticism
should probably be seen as a meta-theoretical explanatory framework, a metahistorical
narrative (White, 1973), or as what Benedict (1934) calls a "pattern of culture," whose reemergence can be triggered not only by direct diffusion and contagion of religious and
philosophical ideas, but also by equivalent social and historical challenges.
''Narrative strategies" signify "procedures followed or narrative devices used to
achieve a specific goal" (Prince, 2003, p. 1961 ). The narrative strategies identified and
analyzed in this paper are members of a broader class of "discourse practices" that aim to
affect social change (Fairclough, 2008). The Gnostic-inflected narratives discussed below
are thus significant in this context not only for their formal rhetorical attributes, but for
their heuristic-explanatory (Fisher, 1989) and by implication life-world generative power
(Gross, 20 I 0). Narrative strategies are also seen as effective means for creating a framework for identification and action. At the national level, narrative strategies anchor and
project an ethnic group onto the broader stage of inter-ethnic or international affairs
(Bhabha, 1990).
In this paper we examine a specific brand of narrative strategy, which shifts the
framework of reference for collective action from "apparent" to "essential" realms of
reality in order to explain the current predicament or future destiny of a group. Specifically, this strategy reverses the terms of a historical situation in a manner similar to that in
which Gnostic philosophy explains the world: what appear to be essential and Good is
just an appearance and an expression of the corruption of Evil and vice-versa (Rudolph,
1987). Moreover, only "true knowledge" (gnosis) reserved to the "chosen ones" can offer
clear understanding of the situation. Gnostic-like narrative strategies share the following
features and/or advance the following themes (Culianu, 1992; Jonas, 1963; Rudolph,
1987):
a.
b.

c.

d.

A cosmic dualism that transforms history into a battle between
Good and Evil;
A reversal of order between appearance and essence, and of the
manner in which these attributes are assigned to the various realms
of reality;
The myth of a metaphysical accident, of a tragic fall that brought
the seeds of the mystic light under the power of the dark forces of
the universe;
The theme of the "latent subversion," which is a form of inner
exile, of recoiling into one's self as a survival strategy under the
circumstances of a hostile cosmic-spiritual domination. This is a
strategy for preserving a sense of virtue in the dim perspective of a
future moment of resurrection and revenge; and
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An attitude of maintammg externally compliant attitudes and
beliefs, while professing a secret ideology opposed to what 1s
currently demanded by those higher up in the power structure.

Such narrative strategies need not be directly connected to an uninterrupted Gnostic
liturgical or theological tradition. They could emerge in an organic way in times of crisis
or transition as a survival or actional device built of specific messianic "logical bricks"
and according to rules of interpretive transformation of reality (Culianu, 1992). The subordinate status of the actors that nourish a messianic religion or culture becomes through
the narrative strategy of reversal not only bearable, but also a sign of election. In other
words, Gnostic-like narrative strategies are interpretive transformation techniques that
turn a story (narrative) of historical defeat into one of victory by changing the significance of the facts, the attributes of the actors, or the meaning of history itself.
Our argument also uses Czeslaw Milosz's "ketman" metaphor (Milosz, 1981) for
interpreting some of the Romanian intellectual elite Gnostic-like behaviors. Of course,
the ketman concept refers to Milosz 's creative interpretation and application to Communist practices of the religious survival strategy first identified by Gobineau ( 1865)
among the non or unorthodox Muslim subjects of Islamic states. While completely agreeing with Milosz's warning that the ketman concept should not be read through the lens of
Gobineau's racist theory of "oriental inferiority," we propose that ketman practices can
be connected with the southeastern European spirit at a point in time that precedes by
several centuries the Communist period. In fact, as Gobineau suggests, ketman and neoByzantine Gnostic-like narrative strategies are directly related historically:
Around Trebizond and Erezoum [note: also known as the last areas of
Byzantine resistance to Muslim occupation] there are religious communities which externally pledge full allegiance to Sunni Islam. In their
villages they have mosques which they visit every Friday; they sponsor
Mullahs for reading them the Koran and who comment for them the
prophetic traditions. "Nevertheless," will they whisper to your ear, "we
are not Muslims; we go to churches, attend the mass, confess the divinity of Jesus Christ and worship the images of the saints." (Gobineau,
1865, p. 16)
Ketman practices and Gnostic-like neo-Byzantine strategies thus share an important
characteristic. They both attempt to hide religious, ideological, or philosophical
knowledge and allegiance from the prying eyes of the Muslim rulers. Furthermore, Gobineau directly links ketman attitudes to the religious mysteries and initiation rituals of the
Middle East that fueled in great measure the Gnostic spiritual project. We believe that by
connection to initiation cults, ketman and Gnostic-like attitudes inherit a similar narrative
strategy of survival. The cunning involved in deceiving the rulers of the day about one 's
true faith is seen as a source of secret power. Furthermore, the success of the deceit, as
both Gobineau and Milosz observed, is interpreted by ketman practitioners as a sign of
spiritual superiority:
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One [i.e., the ketman practitioner] makes all the protestations of faith
that can please him, one performs all the rites one recognizes to be the
most vain, one falsifies one's own books, one exhausts all possible
means of deceit. Thus one acquires the multiple satisfactions and merits
of having place oneself and one's relative under cover, of not having
exposed a venerable faith to the horrible contact of the infidel, and finally of having, in cheating the latter and confirming him in his error,
imposed on him the shame and spiritual misery that he deserves .... Ketman fills the man who practices it with pride. Thanks to it,
a believer raises himself to a permanent state of superiority over the
man he deceives, be he a minister of state or a powerful king; to him
who uses Ketman, the other is a miserable blind man whom one shuts
off from the true path whose existence he does not suspect; while you,
tattered and dying of hunger, trembling externally at the feet of duped
force, your eyes are filled with light, you walk in brightness before
your enemies. It is an unintelligent being that you make sport of; it is a
dangerous beast that you disarm. What a wealth of pleasures ! (Gobineau, 1865, cited in Milosz, 1981, p. 58)
The ketman structure of thought described in this passage can be just as easily applied to the neo-Byzantine Gnostic-like "pattern of thought" discussed at the beginning of
this essay. It could be said that Moldavian church painting reveled in the superiority of
confounding the adversary with one's secret knowledge and religious practices.
Several other scholars have discussed ketman practices in the literature dedicated to
Romanian political culture, especially disguising dissent in the garb of orthodoxy and
deriving feelings of superiority from successfully hiding one's "true" beliefs (Jowitt,
1993; Kligman, 1998; Kotkin & Gross, 2010; Shafir, 1983). These studies, along with
Milosz's work, suggest that the ketman concept should be considered more than just a
vague and suggestive metaphor, and that it can be applied to various historical eras. We
employ his idea as a heuristic ideal-type to elucidate a number of social responses that
have characterized several Romanian intellectual generations, starting with the neoByzantine latent crusader trope identified above.
Yet, in doing so, we do not suggest that the ketman attitudinal and behavioral model
was the same for all times. Rather, the ketman orientation to the world is a type of response modulated by a set of similar, albeit not unchanging, contexts. The ketman concept is particularly relevant ideologically and sociologically in Romania because it can
explain attitudes and behaviors derived from specific ideologically-inflected values in
certain contexts. In broader terms, our essay proposes that the Romanian intellectual
Gnostic ketman-like attitude, especially its fascination with "secret knowledge" and the
sophistic reversal of the "real" and "unreal," of "essential" and "fleeting" (Culianu,
1992), have emerged from a history of submission of Romanian upper (and educated)
classes to a an alien power (Muslim, Western, or later Soviet). Although seen as fundamentally unholy, this submission was interpreted in prophetic and redemptive terms. It
was God 's final test before the ultimate redemption and exaltation of Orthodox Faith,
Romanian Ethnicity, or Romanian culture- the only true spirit of a revived universal
religious, ethnic, and cultural project (Runciman, 1999).
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Gnostic-like Narrative Strategies in the Danubian Principalities
The modern Romanian state emerged in a first phase during the 18th and 19th centuries
through the cultural and political convergence and ultimate merging of Moldova and
Valahia, known at the time as the Danubian Principalities (Boia, 200la; Georgescu,
1991 ; Hitchins, 1996). After the fall of Constantinople (1453) and their de facto incorporation into the Ottoman empire as vassal states, the Principalities became an essential hub
(Pippidi, 2001) in the Christian-Ottoman intellectual network that produced the neoByzantine political theology and ketman attitude briefly presented above (Papacostea,
1983). Born in the 16th and flourishing during the 18th century, the ideology first took
root among the Greek elites that survived the Turkish conquest, also known as Phanariots
(Stavrianos, 2008). These were the surviving Greek merchants and civil servants who
after the Turkish conquest clustered in the Ottoman capital around the Patriarchal Palace
neighborhood of Phanar. In time, Phanariots became key elements of the Ottoman intellectual aristocracy and more importantly an inverted and paradoxical conspirator against
it. Their ideology, labeled by Runciman (1999) as neo-Byzantine and recognized as such
under slightly different labels by other authors (Iorga, 2000; Papachristou, 1992; Papacostea, 1983 ; Zakythinos, 1976), combined outward obedience toward Turkish rule with
nourishing covert and at times grandiose dreams of reviving a new Byzantine Empire.
Yet, this attitude was not unique to the Phanariots. It could also be found among the
Christian princes of the northern borderlands of Moldova and Valahia. Both attitudes
merged during the 17th and 18th centuries, when Phanariots became the official elites
and later rulers of Moldova and Valahia (Georgescu, 1991). According to Runciman
(1999, p. 363), Phanariots "impregnated themselves with memories of Byzantium. While
they sought to increase their riches and through their riches to obtain influence at. .. the
Sultan's court, they dreamed that the influence might ultimately be used to recreate the
Empire of Byzantium. " These dreams went as far as abhorring any separatist and independence movements in the Ottoman lands inhabited by Christians, the Phanariots wishing to "keep the Ottoman Empire intact until the whole could be transferred to the Greeks
in Constantinople" (Runciman, 1999, p. 372).
The Phanariots ' interested loyalty was so convincing that the Sultans made them the
ruling elites of the Romanian lands after 1700 (Runciman, 1999). Once in power, they
replaced and exalted the older local ideology of secret salvation through suffering that we
identified during the reign of Petru Rare~ with a more introverted yet grandiose Gnosticlike narrative strategy of redemption and greatness (Papacostea, 1983). In fact, the 17th
and 18th centuries represented a period of intensified polemics among Greeks about the
world destiny of Byzantine culture and civilization (Zakythinos, 1976). Although subdued by the Turks since 1453, the reborn Byzantine Greek Phanariot elites that made
fortunes and careers after the fall of Constantinople were stirred up by the monumental
defeats of the Turks, especially that of 1683, when the last anti-European jihad was
staved off by Vienna's ramparts and by the Polish king Jan Sobieski's resolute intervention (Wheatcroft, 20 I 0). Furthermore, by 1700 the Ottoman troops also lost Hungary and
Transylvania to the Habsburgs. It was the fust major territorial loss for the Turkish Empire after three centuries of continuous expansion. The Greek-Byzantine elites living in
the Ottoman Empire, including the Greek-Valahian prince ~erban Cantacuzino, promptly
understood that the House of Othman was declining and hope of a resurgence of the
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Byzantine world was rekindled among Greeks everywhere (Papacostea, 1983). To this
end, the Phanariots spared no effort or expense to strengthen and expand their new operational base in the marginal, yet autonomous Christian lands of the Romanians north of the
Danube. These plans resonated very well among the local elites, who had their own secret
dream of reviving Byzantine power (Iorga, 2000). According to Papacostea (1983), even
a rather insignificant prince, like Mihnea III (1658-1659), nourished the imperial dream
of restoring the Byzantine Empire.
Greek influence on Valahia and Moldova was in fact quite significant by 1683.
Greek merchants, clergy, and noblemen had moved to the two principalities with Turkish
assent since the 16th century, soon after Petru Rare~ realized that resistance against the
Turks was futile and that a more compliant policy was needed. The first Greek Prince of
Moldova, loan lacob Heraclid Despot (1561-63) was confirmed on the throne by the
Turks soon after Petru Rareey's death (Pop, Bolovan, & Andea, 2006). His rule was only
an overture, which was followed by the rise of two powerful Phanariot-Romanian families, the Ghicas (of mixed Greek-Albanian origin) and the Cantacuzinos (of Greek and
allegedly imperial origin), who ruled Moldova and Valahia at the end of the 1600s (Lecca, 2000). The Cantacuzinos pursued an active policy of autonomy tinged with imperial
ambitions. According to Papacostea (1983), the Valahian Prince ~erban Cantacuzino
(1678-1688) personally witnessed as a nominal vassal and ally of the Turks the Ottoman
rout under the walls of Vienna in 1683. This gave him the courage to set as one of his
goals in the aftermath of the Turkish defeat to restore his family to the Byzantine throne.
A timely illness, which some chroniclers believed to be the consequence of poisoning
perpetrated by local conspirators who hearing of his plans feared the wrath of the Turks
(Del Chiaro, 1929; Mazilu, 2004), suspended the Valahian neo-Byantine dreams for a
while.
Given the unsettled nature of the northern borders of the Ottoman Empire after 1700,
the Ottomans needed to increase their grip over these gateway provinces. Starting with
Nicolae Mavrocordat, who ruled both Moldova (1709-171 0 and 1711-17 16) and Valahia
( 1716 and 1719-1730), they nominated to the thrones of the two countries' Phanariot
Greeks closely connected with the Ottoman foreign service, which the Sultan thought to
be more trustworthy than the local princes (Runciman, 1999; Zakythinos, 1976). Thus, in
one of those ironies of history, after 1700 the Phanariots' dreams of grandeur and unspoken subversion met with their rulers' need to control their increasingly unsafe Christian
borders. As consummate players of Byzantine politics as the Ottomans were, they used
the Phanariots just as much as the latter thought they were using their masters' apparent
weaknesses (Papachristou, 1992; Runciman, 1999). Staffing the local administration with
Phanariots, the Ottomans rightly counted on the fact that as foreigners they would depend
on Turkish military and political support to stay in power. This was a reasonable plan,
after all, since the Phanariots were already integrated in the Turkish foreign service, in
which they often occupied leading positions, especially those of Grand Dragomans (chief
foreign negotiators) (Zakythinos, 1976). Their extended families, famil y interests, Ottoman careers, and estates spanned several continents and in case of war with the European
powers, they would be less likely to defect than the local elites.
With the arrival of the Phanariot rulers, the nee-Byzantine revival laid strong roots in
the Danubian Principalities. These new Greek-Christian political outposts became active
foci in the Greek debate surrounding the Hellenic revival (Papachristou, 1992;
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Roudometof, 2001 ). This debate included proponents of truly radical positions. For example, there was the vision promoted by Rhigas Velestinlis, who served for a while in the
Greek administration of the Danubian Principalities and who proposed a Greek Republic
modeled in the image of the French revolutionary state, which would unite Greeks, other
Christians, and Turks through the civic bonds of a post-Ottoman Human Rights Declaration (Clogg, 1976). For the obvious reasons, the Phanariots preferred their own version of
intellectual and political ideology, which, in the neo-Byzantine lineage, predictably rejected republicanism and excessive modernism.
The ideology favored by the Danubian elites, Greeks or Hellenized Romanians, was
that of overtly accepting and even promoting the Ottoman rule, while covertly favoring a
slow, gradual, and hopefully non-violent economic and cultural subversion of the Ottoman power. In a way, they believed that time alone would bring about the restoration of
the Christian empire (Zakythinos, 1976). Citing Wilkinson's early 1800s account of Moldova and Valahia under Phanariot rule (Wilkinson, 1971), Runciman (1999) makes the
very astute observation that only the adoption of a neo-Byzantine long-term political
project could justify the expenses and personal risks involved in buying access to the
princiary throne of Moldova or Valahia. Furthermore, mighty houses, such as that of the
Mavrocordats, ruined themselves in the process of ruling the Principalities (Wilkinson,
1971 ). According to Runciman, it was the pursuit of the imperial idea, the rebirth of Byzantium, that motivated what only appears to be irrational behavior:
Under Phanariot princes a neo-Byzantine culture could find a home in
the Principalities. A Greek-born nobility could root itself in lands there;
Greek academies could educate citizens for the new Byzantium. There,
far better than in the shadowy palaces round the Phanar, with Turkish
police at the door, Byzantine ambition could be kept alive. In Roumania, in Rum beyond the Danube, the revival of New Rome could be
planned. (Runciman, 1999, p. 376)
This ideology of rebirth is reflected not only in the implicit political strategy of the
Phanariots, but also in the narratives they discreetly sponsored materially or intellectually. Phanariot princes openly supported the dissemination of popular prophecies and revivalist Greek literature. They financed their printing or copying and facilitated their
circulation throughout the Ottoman Empire. Roudometof (2001) lists a long litany of
prophecies that circulated in manuscript and published form throughout the Turkish empire and Danubian Principalities, which promised deliverance of Constantinople from the
Turkish yoke at precise, yet ever-moving dates: 1492, 1595, 1603, 1653, 1766, 1767, or
1773 (Roudometof, 2001 , p. 352). Such prophecies, probably inspired by the myth of the
savior Emperor (Guran, 2007), were typically coached in common Christian narratives,
yet their ambitions were political. A well-known Bible or Gospel story was usually resignified with political and revolutionary meanings. Robert Walsh, an eye witness of the
Greek revival at a later period (1820), remarked:
The Greeks, who now began to read the Scriptures among other books
made accessible to them, applied its passages, as many have done, to
suit their own particular views. They affirmed that "the seven moun-

40

Journal of Global Initiatives

tains" mentioned in the Apocalypse, and "the many waters," are the
seven hills and seas of Constantinople, and the person "arrayed in purple and scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones," is
the Sultan in his splendid oriental attire; and the saints with whose
"blood he was drunk" are the many martyrs of the Greek Church whom
the Turks put to death. With these passages of Sacred Writ they combined their own apocryphal absurdities. (Walsh, 1836, p. 179)
Political prophecies were particularly popular narrative strategies among the Greek
elites of the Danubian Principalities, who saw themselves as the chosen heralds and possible instruments of any possible second corning of the great Byzantine Empire (Papachristou, 1992). A fragment of Leo the Wise's ancient oracle written in the 1Oth century,
which prophesied the fall and redemption of Constantinople, mentions a mythical emperor John as the ultimate savior, whose ascent will be presaged by a bellowing bull. This
was interpreted by Danubian Phanariots as a sign of their divine calling. They saw in the
bull the bison head on Moldova' s crest, and in the liberating Emperor hero a Danubian
prince, since the ceremonial name of every Moldovan and Valahian princes included by
default the Christian name John (Papachristou, 1992). Furthermore, a very popular prophetic pamphlet "Vision of Agathangelos" believed to be authored by Theoklitos Polyeides, a Greek cleric who took refuge in the Habsburg Empire (Nicolopoulos, 1985),
was dedicated in one of its versions to Grigorie Ghica (Papachristou, 1992), Prince of
Moldova (1764-1767, 1774-1777). The prophecies, which justified the fall of Constantinople under Ottoman rule as "God's will ," announced that the time when Christ's victorious banner will fly again over Byzantium is at hand and that with the help of Russian
and other allegorical Orthodox Princes "the Orthodox faith will be raised high and will
spread from East to West ... " (Nicolopoulos, 1985, p. 46). The fact that prince Ghica
sponsored such a writing should come as no surprise. He represented a typical neeByzantine ketman attitude. While professing loyalty to the Turkish rulers he opposed
some of their policies with much guile and nourished grandiose political schemes for
which he was ultimately executed in 1777 (Papachristou, 1992).
Such prophetic narratives (Clogg, 1976) were a particular effective narrative strategy, aiming to mobilize and maintain the coherence of the Christian and Greek commun ities in the empire. They were the distilled product of expectations of several generation
of Greek intellectuals (Zakythinos, 1976) and of local latent crusader visions descended
from those identified during the reign of Petru Rare~ . A significant characteristic of this
Greek-Byzantine-Danubian political mythology, rewritten in a hermetic and millennia!
key, was its "elective affinity" with Gnosticism. Like Gnosticism, nee-Byzantine ideology places its actors at the heart of a fallen world, whose total and hopeless submission to
the forces of evil is in fact a sign of election and salvation. As indicated above, this affinity is not the product of direct contact with Gnostic texts, but of a similar challenge, that
of the passing of a world, the Ottoman Empire, and the birth of another, that of national ities. Like the ancient wisdom of the "elected few," nee-Byzantine political ideology and
the narrative strategies that it generated emphasized a dualist vision of the world (Good
vs. Evil), combined, due to the constraints of the time, with a ketman attitude. While they
rejected Ottoman mle as a symbol of Satan, some Greek elites, especially those vested in
the Ottoman regime, deployed narrative strategies that tried to justify the existence of
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Ottoman rule and their participation in it as part of a cosmic plan that would result in the
ultimate victory of Christianity and the consecration of Greek nationality as its most
authentic champion.
This narrative strategy is clearly expressed at the end of the 18th century by Athanasius of Paros, who perfectly illustrates the ketman opinions of many Christian, including
Romanian-Greek elite members living in the Ottoman Empire (Papacostea, 1983). The
argument for Greek-Orthodox superiority and salvation is constructed in such a deft narrative that even the Ottoman Sultan could not but welcome:
[God] raised up from nothing this strong Empire of the Ottomans in the
place of our Roman Empire, which had begun in some respects to halt
in the doctrines of the Orthodox Faith, and He exalted this Empire of
the Ottomans above all others, that He might show beyond doubt that
this had come to pass by God 's will and not through the power of
men .... He put into the heart of the Emperor ofthese Ottomans to keep
our Orthodox Faith in liberty and to give it exceeding authority, so that
at times it might instruct even Christians who had turned out of the way
to have the fear of god ever before their eyes. (Zakythinos, 1976, p.
173)
This narrative strategy was quite prevalent among the Greek leaders, being embraced
even by Patriarch Anthimos of Jerusalem, who in 1798 issued a "paternal exhortation" in
which the Ottomans were presented as the true instrument of salvation:
[God] raised up the empire of the Ottomans higher than any other kingdom so as to show without doubt that it came about by divine will, and
not by the power of man, and to assure all the faithful that in this way
He deigned to bring about a great mystery, namely salvation to his chosen people. (cited in Clogg, 1976, p. 59)
Moreover, in 1821 the Greek elites in Constantinople, including the Patriarch, rejected in true ketman style the Greek movement of liberation that ultimately led to the birth
of the modern Greek state. An anathema decree was issued by the Greek Patriarchate, in
which the Sultan was bestowed with all praises reserved to traditional Byzantine Emperors (Clogg, 1976). Unfortunately, the ketman stratagem did not work. Scared by the intensity of the rebellion initiated in Valahia by a scion of a Danubian princiary family
(Alexandros Ypsilanti), the Patriarch was promptly hanged, his body left dangling from
the Patriarchal main door for three days, unhooked by a mob on the fourth day, dragged
through the offal of a nearby market, and thrown in the Bosporus (Clogg, 1976).
The Greek ketman attitudes and the narrative strategies they entailed resonated
strongly among the Greek-Romanian political and intellectual elites in the decades immediately preceding the Greek insurrection. Dimitrie Fotino, a Greek historian and educator who moved to Valahia at the end of the 18th century, deplored the fall of Constantinople within the framework of a narrative strategy reminiscing of Peresvetov's cosmic
plans for Orthodox Christianity: "Oh, Sun, shiver, oh, Earth, sigh, for the total abandonment of the Greek nation for its sins by God, the just judge" (Papacostea, 1983, p. 462).
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In other words, Turkish rule is justified by Greek sins and is a possible sign for a future
revival. An even more interesting narrative strategy is that advanced by Dimitris Katarzis
(Catargiu), grand logothete of Valahia. While promoting the most ardent Hellenism and
extolling the virtue of Greek culture and its civilizing power, Catargiu proposed that the
Ottoman empire can also be seen as a vehicle for realizing the civilizing call of Greek
culture. He claimed that the Greeks of Byzantine stock are actively present in the political
life of the Ottoman empire, with rights and privileges that qualify them as citizens:
"There are many of our race (Greek) who hold offices, namely patriarchs, high prelates,
and administrators with imperial berates (patents) .. . [which] fall under Aristotle's definition of a citizen" (Papachristou, 1992, p. 25) . In the subtext, as Papachristou (1992) suggests, Catargiu's discourse signaled to the Greek community that "in fact, Greek influences could emerge from within and change radically the empire to their favor" (p. 15).
Zakynthinos summarizes the overall parameters of this narrative strategy in these terms:
[T]he leading class of the Church hierarchy and the administrative aristocracy, who had grown up under the rule of the Sultan in Constantinople or in Wallachia or Moldavia, were all inspired by the universalist
ideal of Byzantium which they invoked to justify both their blacker and
their more commendable actions. Fluctuating between contradictory
schools of thought, they framed an early version of the "Great Idea"
which one might call neo-Byzantine. According to this theory, Greek
influences, attacking from within, would emerge as the dominant force
at the heart of the Turkish Empire, and the Greeks would become corulers of the "mighty Monarchy" and would transform this into a multiracial state, thus realizing their own liberating, political dream through
the Turkish Empire which would be transfigured as an "Ottoman State
ofthe Greek Nation" (Zakythinos, 1976, p. 148)
The significance of this narrative strategy goes beyond the narrow political interests
of the Danubian Principalities and their 18th century Phanariot rulers. This is as much a
cultural as a political (Henderson, 1970) narrative strategy, which infused the educational
environment created by the Phanariots north of the Danube and in which the future generations of modem Romanian intellectuals will grow. The two higher learning institutions
the Greek rulers established in Romania, one in Bucharest and the other in Ia~i , promoted
with ardor Greek-Orthodox and Byzantine ideals of a civilizing and world renewing
Hellenic culture (Camariano-Cioran, 1971 ). Furthermore, these cultural institutions have
created several generations of thinkers in a spirit of cultural messianism dominated by
Gnostic-like narrative strategies. Among them one can count a central figure of Romanian cultural 19th century rebirth, Ion Helide Radulescu, who was not only a student but
during the 1830s and 1840s also one of the principals of the old Valahian Greek-founded
school (Anghelescu, 2001; Cornea, 1972). We will find him among the 1848 revolutionaries, a living link between the old and new Gnostic-like cultural response to the decline
and fall of the Ottoman Empire.
In the political realm, the conservative and messianic ideology of the Phanariots was
thoroughly absorbed by the local elites. As Vlad Georgescu points out in his treatise on
the emergence of modem political ideas in the Danubian Principalities, Romanian elites
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expressed their ideological and political needs through a "complex structure of culture
and civilization, theoretically based on the conservative, traditional, Orthodox elements,
on neo-Greek culture and clothed in oriental garb due to historical circumstances."
(Georgescu, 1972, p. 195). The dominant attitude of the Romanian political and intellectual elites during the last decades of the 18th and the first decades of the 19th century was
one of strategic expectation. Significantly enough, the 1821 Greek insurrection against
Turkish rule was started in Valahia by Alexandros Ypsilanti, the grandson and son of
local Greek princes (both representatives of the neo-Byzantine ethos discussed by Zakynthinos), yet it was not entirely supported by the Romanian establishment (Georgescu,
1991). Furthermore, a local revolutionary movement led by Tudor Vladimirescu soon
distanced itself from the Greek insurrection ending in open conflict with the Greeks.
Although Vladimirescu was assassinated by Ypsilanti, the Greeks were themselves defeated by the Turks and the Greek rule of the Principalities ended (Georgescu, 1991). The
local elites, believing in a future redemption of those who so secretly professed the true
hope and teachings of the Faith, realigned themselves with the official Turkish rule, hoping to influence things from within. At times, they aligned themselves with the Russians,
but Turkish rule continued in the Romanian lands until 1878 (Hitchins, 1996).
Meanwhile, the local elites continued their mythopoetic activity. They generated new
narratives on the canvass of the same general Gnostic-like strategy, which placed them in
a new "imagined community" of thought and hope (Anderson, 1983). This community
was an entity much bigger than the actual political body of which it was a part. It was a
community of spiritual splendor and imperial greatness related to the ancient glory of
Rome and traditional European values, which were identified as the true source of Romanian identity. This radical virtualization of power and glory was an answer to the con tined dominance not only of Turkish, but after 1829 Russian and later, and after 1856
Austrian, powers over the Romanian lands.
With this rebirth of hope, the narrative strategy of messianic exaltation survived the
late Ottoman empire era and become a recyclable intellectual resource. The covert Gnostic mythology nourished by a minuscule 17th to 18th century intellectual and political
elite grew over the following centuries into an overt official ideology supported by a
modem propaganda machine. The penchant of Romanian intelligentsia to invent a na·onal mythology in which past defeats and humiliations are interpreted as tests for a
future messianic fate has been amply documented by Boia (200 1b). Nineteenth century
intellectual mythems such as "Romanians saved Christian civilization by guarding the
Levantine gates of Europe" or "Romanians are the true inheritors of Orthodoxy (or Latin. )"are strikingly similar to those peddled by the Neo-Byzantine elites of the 18th century. Although we do not have the time to explore the connection between the two strands
of thought here, this is a very promising area for further research, that could open new
venues for understanding Romanian modernization. In what follows we will limit our
·scussion to the possible articulation points of a future theory of Romanian modemiza·on, which could use the insight that Gnostic-like narrative strategies could be one of the
nstitutive building blocks for Romanian early modem consciousness.

Gnostic-like Narrative Strategies and Ideological Reversibility
'=ollowing Gnostic thought patterns and narrative strategies through a variety of contexts
. d events, we have identified an ideological-mythological topos that is activated by
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specific historical challenges, especially those that are associated with early modernity,
ethnic conflict, and national subordination to a Muslim imperial order. This topos is determined by at least three coordinates: a) a religious dimension expressed by a yearning
for ultimate moral values and for a sacred order of the universe and encapsulated into
sophisticated eschatological hermeneutics; b) an ideological capacity for organizing
inherited and modern representations of the world and society into a rational narrative
strategy, which turns these representations into coherent systems of ideas that could be
used for political legitimation and/or collective identity building; c) the emotional and
narrative logic of a mythological vision of symbolic self-enfranchisement and empowerment.
In fact, Gnostic-like narrative strategies are the ultimate hybrid, a creation of the
murky and ambiguous transition from a rather peculiar "traditional" society (neither
Oriental, nor fully Western feudal) to an ever more contradictory and insufficiently specified post-Ottoman modernity. As hybrids, they inevitably emerge in the process of "peripheral" modernization, in which local and global cultural forms , fashions, and concepts
mix and cross-pollinate, producing unexpected results. Furthermore, these hybrids are
intermediary stages on the road to complete and functional secularization and modernization, both seen as ideal types, not as Western templates (Dobrescu, 2003; Matei, 2004).
It is also possible that such an interpretation is too teleological, explaining away,
rather than simple explicating a far more complex reality. The ambiguities built into the
Gnostic-like thought patterns and narrative strategies, which freely mix emotional and
expressive needs with political theology and modern-style ideological rationalization,
might ultimately fail to transform pre-modern into modern cultural and narrative strategies. On the contrary, ambiguity might very well become a permanent state and function
as a semantic glue that generates a stable or at least constantly recurrent configuration of
choices and preferences. In other words, thought patterns and narrative strategies, together with the superstructures that they make possible (political ideologies, cultural values,
common sense, etc.), become chronically ambiguous or, with a term already consecrated
in Romanian cultural analysis, "paramodern" (Matei, 2004). This ambiguity should not
necessarily be identified at the finest level of analysis. It might very well be that any
given cultural entity could function quite consistently within its own universe. That is,
esthetic symbols could direct some aspects of cultural and political thought, doctrines or
theological-eschatological concepts can direct others, while rationalistic ideologies and
thought paradigms can innerve yet other cultural realms . Yet, their recycling without any
necessary succession and in a rather opportunistic manner, depending on context, might
lead to very unclear and incomplete separation of religion, ideology, and aesthetics (Matei & Momescu, 2010).
A closer inspection of the historical case surveyed in the present essay can provide a
conversation starter about the ambiguous but stable alliance between symbolicalimaginative and conceptual-procedural thinking that can be identified in Gnostic-like
narrative strategies. Gnostic narrative strategies create a cognitive-symbolical apparatus
so unstable that it can be used not only to convert a latent crusading spirit into actual
radicalism. but also vice-versa. This reversibility principle is relevant for understanding
processes ignificantly larger than Romanian modernization per se. It could, for instance
provide new insights into the recent history of the Balkans, with its unexpected upsurge
during the 1990s of a crusader anti-Islamic spirit in the midst of what appeared to be
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during the 1980s a stable, pluralistic, and decidedly secular Yugoslavia. It could also help
us reevaluate the political culture of the late Ottoman empire from which emerged no
only the elites of modern Greece, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, but also those of Turke
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Iraq. Proposing a common political cultural heritage for
these disparate cultures would be legitimate because both the Christian-Orthodox and the
Islamic inheritors of the former Ottoman Empire might have preserved the moral obligation of perpetuating the memory of a "holy war" against their religious Other complete
with a range of ideological-symbolic strategies of indefinitely suspending such a war, and
of justifYing if not glorifYing the social and political status quo.
To conclude, we hope that our contributions helps the scholarly community interested in elucidating the modernization process in Eastern Europe to appreciate the role
played by Gnostic-like narrative strategies as cradles of the local modernization ideologies. Much can and needs to be done to completely validate this line of research, but we
are determined that it provides a very fertile ground for further theoretical and historical
inquiry.
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